Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970 by David A Korn

Author:David A Korn [Korn, David A]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Diplomacy, Middle Eastern, Social Science, Political Science, World, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9781000276978
Google: 6AeiDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 49789510
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-07-11T00:00:00+00:00

A settlement between Israel and Egypt, Rogers said, would require Egypt to “agree to a binding and specific commitment to peace” and Israel to withdraw “to the international border between Israel and Egypt which has been in existence for over half a century.”40

In the Arab world, the speech generally accomplished the purpose that Sisco and Atherton had in mind. At first, public reaction in Egypt was critical, though not harshly so. In Jordan and Saudi Arabia, government officials were cautiously noncommittal in their public remarks, but privately the speech drew warm expressions of appreciation. Thoughtful and responsible Arabs saw the American proposals as fair and just and as proof that the United States could be sympathetic to their problems as well as to Israel’s. Even the Egyptians were later to find more merit in Rogers’ speech.

In Israel, the first reaction was surprisingly mild, perhaps because the proposals were already well known there. On December 10, the Cabinet issued a statement blaming the Arabs for lack of progress and reiterating Israel’s insistence on a peace treaty—not merely a contractual agreement— and on direct negotiations. The Cabinet expressed regret that the United States had made detailed reference to the terms of peace between Israel and Egypt, since this, it said, was something for the parties themselves to decide. Foreign Minister Eban, the statement concluded, would explain Israel’s position in his upcoming talk with Secretary Rogers.41

Less than two weeks later, the Israeli government spoke out with an entirely different voice. On December 22, the Cabinet held a special emergency meeting. The statement issued at its close attacked Rogers’ proposals in scorching terms. They were, it said, “an attempt to appease [the Arabs] at the expense of Israel.” This time it was flatly declared that “the Cabinet rejects these American proposals.”

What happened between December 10 and 22 to cause the Israeli government to move from an on the whole gentle expression of objection to an outraged statement of categorical rejection? On December 18, the United States presented in the four-power forum a proposal for a settlement between Israel and Jordan similar to its October 29 plan for Israel and Egypt. Even before Rogers’ speech, King Hussein had pressed the United States to make clear that it would do no less for its friend Jordan than it had for Egypt. He and other Arab leaders had made the point that to have credibility in the Arab world—and at the soon-to-be-convened Rabat conference—the United States would have to show that it favored a comprehensive solution, not just a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. The plan for Jordan called for the return to the Hashemite kingdom of all of the West Bank, except for mutually agreed “insubstantial changes,” and for joint Jordanian-Israeli administration of Jerusalem.

Nixon approved the plan for Jordan, but, as before, he balanced this public step to conciliate the Arabs by another taken surreptitiously to propitiate the Israelis. He instructed Leonard Garment, his White House aide who handled liaison with the Jewish community, to assure Golda Meir privately that the United States would not press them to accept the plan.

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